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Abstract. Deep learning models are known to be vulnerable not only
to input-dependent adversarial attacks but also to input-agnostic or
universal adversarial attacks. Dezfooli et al. [8,9] construct universal
adversarial attack on a given model by looking at a large number of
training data points and the geometry of the decision boundary near
them. Subsequent work [5] constructs universal attack by looking only at
test examples and intermediate layers of the given model. In this paper, we
propose a simple universalization technique to take any input-dependent
adversarial attack and construct a universal attack by only looking at
very few adversarial test examples. We do not require details of the given
model and have negligible computational overhead for universalization.
We theoretically justify our universalization technique by a spectral
property common to many input-dependent adversarial perturbations,
e.g., gradients, Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and DeepFool. Using
matrix concentration inequalities and spectral perturbation bounds, we
show that the top singular vector of input-dependent adversarial directions
on a small test sample gives an effective and simple universal adversarial
attack. For VGG16 and VGG19 models trained on ImageNet, our simple
universalization of Gradient, FGSM, and DeepFool perturbations using a
test sample of 64 images gives fooling rates comparable to state-of-the-art
universal attacks [8,5] for reasonable norms of perturbation.
1 Introduction
Neural network models achieve high accuracy on several image classification tasks
but are also known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Szegedy et al. [13]
show tiny pixel-wise changes in images that, although imperceptible to the human
eye, make highly accurate neural network models grossly misclassify. For a given
classifier f , an adversarial attack A perturbs each input x by a carefully chosen
small perturbation A(x) that changes the predicted label as f(x+A(x)) 6= f(x),
for most inputs. Most adversarial attacks are input-dependent, i.e., A(x) depends
on x. If the underlying model parameters θ for the classifier f are trained to
minimize certain loss function L(θ, x, y) on data point x with label y, then
perturbing along the gradient ∇xL(θ, x, y) is a natural adversary for maximizing
loss, and hopefully, changing the predicted label. If an adversarial attack A
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that changes each pixel value by at most ±, then its `∞-norm is bounded as
‖A(x)‖∞ ≤ , for all x. Szegedy et al. [13] find such a perturbation using box-
constrained L-BFGS. Goodfellow et al. [3] propose the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) using A(x) =  sign (∇xL(θ, x, y)) as a faster approach to find such an
adversarial perturbation. Subsequent work on FGSM includes an iterative variant
by Kurakin et al. [6] and another version called Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) by Madry et al. [7], both of which construct adversarial perturbations of
bounded `∞-norm. On the other hand, DeepFool by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [10]
computes a minimal `2-norm adversarial perturbation iteratively. In each iteration,
it uses a polyhedron Pt to approximate a region around the current iterate x(t),
where the classifier output is the same as f(x(t)). The next iterate x(t+1) is the
projection of x(t) on to the nearest face of Pt. The algorithm terminates when
f(x(t)) 6= f(x), so the perturbation produced by DeepFool on input x is x(t) − x.
All input-dependent adversarial attacks mentioned above can be executed at test
time with access only to the given model but not its training data.
Fig. 1: Illustration of the universal adversarial attack problem.
Universal adversarial perturbations are input-agnostic, i.e., a given model gets
fooled into misclassification by the same perturbation on a large fraction of inputs.
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8] construct a universal adversarial attack by clever,
iterative calls to their input-dependent DeepFool attack. They theoretically justify
the phenomenon of universal adversarial perturbations using certain geometric
assumptions about the decision boundary [9]. Given a data distribution D, a
universal adversarial perturbation is a vector v of small `2-norm such that
f(x+ v) 6= f(x), with high probability (called the fooling rate), for test input x
sampled from the distribution D. For a given bound  on the `2-norm of universal
adversarial perturbation and a given desired fooling rate, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.
[8] take a sample S of training data, initialize v = 0¯, and proceed iteratively as
follows: if the fraction of x ∈ S for which f(x+ v) 6= f(x) is less than the desired
fooling rate, then they pick an x such that f(x+ v) = f(x), and find a minimal
`2-norm perturbation ∆vx such that f(x+ v +∆vx) 6= f(x+ v) using DeepFool.
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Then they update v to v + ∆vx and scale it down, if required, to have its `2-
norm bounded by . Figure 1 gives an illustration of their approach on points
x1, x2, x3 belonging to distinct classes, shown in three colours. For visualization
the regions containing these points are shown overlapped at points x1, x2, x3,
which is the point labeled x in the figure.Let g1, g2, g3 be the minimal `2-norm
perturbations such that f(xi + gi) 6= f(xi). Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8] iteratively
find adversarial perturbations ∆v1 and ∆v2 such that f(x2 + g1 +∆v1) 6= f(x2)
and f(x3 + g1 +∆v1 +∆v2) 6= f(x3). In Figure 1, v = g1 +∆v1 +∆v2 achieves
f(xi + v) 6= f(xi), for i = 1, 2, 3, simultaneously. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8] show
that the universal adversarial perturbation constructed as above from a large
sample of training data gives a good fooling rate even on test data. Note that
the above construction of universal adversarial attack requires access to training
data and several iterations of DeepFool attack.
The above discussion raises some natural, important questions: (a) Is there
a simpler construction to universalize any given input-dependent adversarial
attack? (b) Can a universal attack be constructed efficiently using access to the
model and very few test inputs but not the entire training or test data? We
answer both of these questions affirmatively.
Summary of our results
• Our first observation is that many known input-dependent adversarial attack
directions have only a small number of dominant principal components on the
entire data. We show this for attacks based on the Gradient of the loss function,
the FGSM attack, and DeepFool, on a variety of architectures and datasets.
However, we report the findings only on ImageNet.
• Consider a matrix whose each row corresponds to input-dependent adver-
sarial direction for a test data point. Our second observation is that a small
perturbation along the top principal component of this matrix is an effective
universal adversarial attack. This simple SVD-Universal algorithm combined with
Gradient, FGSM and DeepFool directions gives us SVD-Gradient, SVD-FGSM
and SVD-DeepFool universal adversarial attacks, respectively.
• Our third observation is that the top principal component can be well-
approximated from a very small sample of the test data, and SVD-Universal
approximated from even a small sample gives a fooling rate comparable to
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8].
•We give a theoretical justification of this phenomenon using matrix concentration
inequalities and spectral perturbation bounds. This observation holds across
multiple input-dependent adversarial attack directions given by Gradient, FGSM
and DeepFool.
1.1 Related work
The most relevant baselines for our work are the universal adversarial attacks
by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8] and Khrulkov and Oseledets [5]. Our approach to
construct a universal adversarial attack is to take an input-dependent adversarial
attack on a given model, and then find a single direction via SVD that is
simultaneously well-aligned with the different input-dependent attack directions
4 Sandesh Kamath, Amit Deshpande, and K V Subrahmanyam
for most test data points. This is different from the approach of Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. [8] explained in Figure 1. When a training data point is not fooled by
a smaller perturbation in previous iterations, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8] apply
DeepFool to such already-perturbed but unfooled data points. In contrast, our
universalization uses input-dependent attack directions only on a small sample
of test data, and even the simple universalization of gradient directions (instead
of DeepFool) already gives a comparable fooling rate to the universal attack of
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8] in our experiments.
Khrulkov and Oseledets [5] propose a state-of-the-art universal adversarial
attack that requires expensive computation and access to the hidden layers of
the given neural network model. They consider the function fi(x) computed
by the i-th hidden layer on input x, and its Jacobian Ji(x) = ∂fi/∂x
∣∣
x
. Using
‖fi(x + v) − fi(x)‖q ≈ ‖Ji(x)v‖q, they solve (p, q)-SVD problem to maximize∑
x∈X ‖Ji(x)v‖qq subject to ‖v‖p = 1 over the entire data X . They optimize for
the choice of layer i and (p, q) in the (p, q)-SVD for the i-th hidden layer. They
hypothesize that this objective can be empirically approximated by a sample
S of size m from test data (see Eqn.(8) in [5]). With extensive experiments on
ILSVRC 2012 validation data for VGG-16, VGG-19 and ResNet50 models, they
empirically find the best layer i to attack and the empirically best choice of (p, q)
(e.g., q = 10 for p =∞). We do not solve the general (p, q)-SVD, which is known
to be NP-hard for most choices of (p, q) [1,2]. Our SVD-Universal algorithm uses
the regular SVD (p = q = 2), which can be solved provably and efficiently. Our
method does not require access to hidden layers, and it universalizes several
known input-dependent adversarial perturbations. We prove that our objective
can be well-approximated from only a small sample of test data (Theorem 2),
which is only hypothesized by Khrulkov and Oseledets [5] for their objective (see
Eqn.(8) in [5]).
Recent work has also considered model-agnostic and data-agnostic adversarial
perturbations. Tramer et al. [14] study model-agnostic perturbations in the
direction of the difference between the intra-class means, and come up with
adversarial attacks that transfer across different models. Mopuri et al. [11] propose
a data-agnostic adversarial attack that depends only on the model architecture.
Given a trained neural network with k hidden (convolution) layers, they start
with a random image v and minimize
∏k
i=1 `i(v) subject to ‖v‖∞ ≤ , where
`i(v) is the mean activation of the i-th hidden layer for input v. The authors
show that the optimal perturbation v for this objective exhibits a data-agnostic
adversarial attack.
2 Universalization of adversarial attacks: SVD-Universal
First, we set up the notation and define the most important metric fooling rate
formally. Let D denote the data distribution on image-label pairs (x, y), with
images as a d-dimensional vectors in some X ⊆ Rd and labels in [k] = {1, 2, . . . , k}
for k-class classification, e.g., CIFAR-10 data has images with 32 × 32 pixels
that are essentially 1024-dimensional vectors of pixel values, each in [0, 1], along
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with their respective labels for 10-class classification. Let (X,Y ) be a random
data point from D and let f : X → [k] be a k-class classifier. We use θ to
denote the model parameters for classifier f , and let L(θ, x, y) denote the loss
function it minimizes on the training data. The accuracy of classifier f is given by
Pr(X,Y ) (f(X) = Y ). A classifier f is said to be fooled on input x by adversarial
perturbation A(x) if f(x+A(x)) 6= f(x). The fooling rate of the adversary A is
defined as Pr(X,Y ) (f(X +A(X)) 6= f(X)).
Algorithm 1: SVD-Universal Algorithm
Data: A neural network N , an input-dependent adversarial attack A, and n
test samples.
Result: A universal attack direction for neural network N
1 For test samples x1, x2, . . . , xn, obtain input-dependent perturbation vectors
a1 = A(x1), a2 = A(x2), . . . , an = A(xn) for the neural network N .
2 Normalize ai’s to get the attack directions or unit vectors ui = ai/||ai||2, for
i = 1 to n.
3 Form a matrix M whose rows are u1, u2, . . . , un.
4 Compute Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of M as M = USV T , with
V = [v1|v2| . . . |vn].
5 Return the top right singular vector v1 as the universal attack vector.
Our approach to construct a universal adversarial attack is to take an input-
dependent adversarial attack on a given model, and then find a single direction
via SVD that is simultaneously well-aligned with the different input-dependent
attack directions for most test data points. We apply this approach to a very
small sample (less than 0.2%) of test data, and use the top singular vector as
a universal adversarial direction. Our algorithm is presented as SVD-Universal
(Algorithm 1). We prove that if the input-dependent attack directions satisfy a
certain spectral property, then our approach can provably result in a good fooling
rate (Theorem 1), and we prove that a small sample size suffices, independent of
the data dimensionality (Theorem 2).
Our SVD-Universal algorithm is flexible enough to universalize many popular
input-dependent adversarial attack. We apply it to three different ways to con-
struct input-dependent perturbations: (a) Gradient attack that perturbs an input
x in the direction ∇xL(θ, x, y), (b) FGSM attack [3] that perturbs x in the direc-
tion sign (∇xL(θ, x, y)), (c) DeepFool attack [10] which is an iterative algorithm
explained in Section 1. For the above three input-dependent attacks, we call
the universal adversarial attack produced by SVD-Universal as SVD-Gradient,
SVD-FGSM, and SVD-DeepFool, respectively.
SVD-Universal (Algorithm 1) pseudocode samples a set of n images from the
test (or validation) set. We use the terms batch size and sample size interchange-
ably. For each of the sampled points we compute an input-dependent attack
direction. We stack these attack directions as rows of a matrix. The top right
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singular vector of this matrix of attack directions is the universal adversarial
direction that SVD-Universal outputs.
2.1 Comparison of fooling rates of SVD-Universal with
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.[8], Khrulkov and Oseledets [5]
We evaluate the fooling rate of SVD-Gradient, SVD-FGSM and SVD-DeepFool
on the validation set of the ImageNet dataset on VGG16, VGG19 and ResNet50.
We used off the shelf code available for these architectures. In these architectures
pixel intensities of images are scaled down and images are normalized before they
are deployed for use in classifiers. Our (unit) attack vectors are constructed using
batch size of 64(0.13%). We found that SVD-Universal attacks obtained using
batch size of 64 perform as well as SVD-Universal attacks obtained using larger
batch sizes of 128 and 1024(refer to Appendix B.1).
Our observations. (i) SVD-Gradient attack scaled to have norm 50 has a
fooling rate of 0.32 on the validation set of ImageNet for VGG19. Note that the
average `2 norm of this validation set is 450
3. (ii) We visualize the perturbed
images in Figure 2 when  is 16 (3.5% of the average norm of input images) and
when  is 50 (11% of the average norm of input images). These perturbations are
quasi-imperceptible [8].
Table 1: On ImageNet validation, VGG16 vs VGG19 vs ResNet50 vs M-DFFF:
fooling rate vs. norm of perturbation. Attacks constructed using 64 samples.
Network Vector (using 64 samples) Norm 18 (4%) Norm 32 (7.1%) Norm 64 (14.2%)
VGG16 SVD-Gradient 0.12 0.19 0.34
SVD-FGSM 0.10 0.17 0.31
SVD-DeepFool 0.12 0.20 0.37
M-DFFF 0.11 0.20 0.36
Khrulkov-Oseledets 0.52
VGG19 SVD-Gradient 0.13 0.21 0.38
SVD-FGSM 0.10 0.17 0.30
SVD-DeepFool 0.11 0.19 0.33
M-DFFF 0.11 0.19 0.31
Khrulkov-Oseledets 0.60
ResNet50 SVD-Gradient 0.10 0.16 0.28
SVD-FGSM 0.09 0.14 0.24
SVD-DeepFool 0.10 0.17 0.29
M-DFFF 0.09 0.16 0.28
Khrulkov-Oseledets 0.44
We compare our results with that of Moosavi-Dezfooli et al [8] and Khrulkov
and Oseledets [5] on the validation set of Imagenet(refer to Table 1). For more
3 https://github.com/pytorch/examples/tree/master/imagenet
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Norm 0 Norm 16 Norm 50 Norm 100
Fig. 2: Sample images from ImageNet validation set perturbed with SVD-DeepFool
of different l2 norms.
detailed fooling rate plots refer to Appendix B. The average `2 norm of the
dataset used in their experiments is 50,000, the average `∞ norm is 250, [8,
Footnote, Page 4]. In our experiments the pixel intensities are to normalized to
[0, 1], and the average `2 norm is 450.
The `2 norm of the perturbation used in Moosavi-Dezfooli et al [8] is 4%
of 50,000. The `∞ norm of the universal perturbation used in Khrulkov and
Oseledets [5] is 4% of 250 = 10. In Khrulkov and Oseledets [5, Figure 9], the
authors report that the universal perturbation of [8] constructed from a batch size
64 and having `∞ norm 10 has a fooling rate of 0.14 on VGG19. A comparable
perturbation in our model has `2 norm 4% of 450, and we get a fooling rate of
0.13 on VGG19.
To further compare our universal perturbations with that of Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al [8], the same 64 samples used to construct our SVD-Universal vectors were
used to obtain the universal perturbation vector, M-DFFF, of Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al [8]. This vector was scaled down to get a unit vector w in `2 norm. We
observe trends similar to what was reported in Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8, Table
1] - the fooling rate achieved by M-DFFF on VGG16 is higher than that of
M-DFFF on VGG19.
Khrulkov and Oseledets [5] get a fooling rate of more than 0.4 using batch
size of 64 and `∞ norm 10. Their universal attack is stronger than both our attack
and that of Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8]. However, Khrulkov and Oseledets [5] do
an extensive experimentation and determine which intermediate layer to attack
and (p, q) are also optimized to maximize the fooling rate of their (p, q)-singular
vector. (p, q)-SVD computation is expensive and is known to be a hard problem,
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[1,2]. We do no such optimization and use p = q = 2, our emphasis being on the
simplicity and universality of our SVD-Universal algorithm. We also observe a
trend similar to what is reported by Khrulkov and Oseledets [5] - the fooling rate
of SVD-Universal attacks is higher on VGG16 and VGG19 than on ResNet50.
We would like to point out that the values quoted for Khrulkov-Oseledets in
Table 1 are taken as is from [5, Table 4].
3 Theoretical Analysis of SVD-Universal
In this section, we provide a theoretical justification for the existence of universal
adversarial perturbations. Let (X,Y ) denote a random sample from D. Let
f : Rd → [k] be a given classifier, and for any x ∈ Rd, let A(x) be the adversarial
perturbation given by a fixed attack A, say FGSM, DeepFool.
Define A = {x : f(x+A(x)) 6= f(x)}. For any x ∈ A, assume that x+A(x)
lies on the decision boundary, and let the hyperplane Hx = {x + z ∈ Rd :
〈z,A(x)〉 = ‖A(x)‖22} be a local, linear approximation to the decision boundary
at x + A(x). This holds for adversarial attacks such as DeepFool by Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. [10] which try to find an adversarial perturbation A(x) such that
x+A(x) is the nearest point to x on the decision boundary. Now consider the
halfspace Sx = {x + z ∈ Rd : 〈z,A(x)〉 ≥ ‖A(x)‖22}. Note that x /∈ Sx and
x+A(x) ∈ Sx. For simplicity of analysis, we assume that f(x+z) 6= f(x), for all
x ∈ A and x+ z ∈ Sx. This is a reasonable assumption in a small neighborhood
of x. In fact this hypothesis is implied by the positive curvature of the decision
boundary assumed in the analysis of Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [9]. Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. [9] empirically verify the validity of this hypothesis. In other words, we
assume that if an adversarial perturbation A(x) fools the model at x, then any
perturbation z having a sufficient projection along A(x), also fools the model at
x. This is a reasonable assumption in a small neighborhood of x.
Theorem 1. Given any joint data distribution D on features or inputs in Rd
and true labels in [k], let (X,Y ) denote a random sample from D. For any x ∈ Rd,
let A(x) be its adversarial perturbation by a fixed input-dependent adversarial
attack A. Let
M = E
[ A(X)
‖A(X)‖2
A(X)T
‖A(X)‖2
]
∈ Rd×d,
and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 be the top eigenvalue of M and v ∈ Rd be the normalized unit
eigenvector. Then under the assumption that f(x+ z) 6= f(x), for all x ∈ A and
x+ z ∈ Sx, we have
Pr (f(X + u) 6= f(X)) ≥ Pr (f(X +A(X)) 6= f(X))− 1− λ
1− δ2 ,
where u = ±(/δ)v, where  = max
x
‖A(x)‖2.
Proof. Let µ(x) denote the induced probability density on features or inputs
by the distribution D. Define A = {x : f(x + A(x)) 6= f(x)} and G = {x :
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|〈A(x), v〉| ≥ δ ‖A(x)‖2}. Since λ is the top eigenvalue of M with v as its
corresponding (unit) eigenvector,
λ = E
[〈 A(X)
‖A(X)‖2
, v
〉2]
=
∫
x∈G
〈 A(x)
‖A(x)‖2
, v
〉2
µ(x)dx+
∫
x/∈G
〈 A(x)
‖A(x)‖2
, v
〉2
µ(x)dx
≤
∫
x∈G
µ(x)dx+ δ2
∫
x/∈G
µ(x)dx because ‖v‖2 = 1
= Pr (G) + δ2 (1− Pr (G))
= (1− δ2) Pr (G) + δ2.
Thus, Pr (G) ≥ (λ − δ2)/(1 − δ2), and equivalently, Pr (Gc) = 1 − Pr (G) ≤
(1− λ)/(1− δ2). Now for any x ∈ G, we have |〈A(x), v〉| ≥ δ ‖A(x)‖2. Letting
 = maxx ‖A(x)‖2, we get |〈A(x), (/δ)v〉| ≥ ‖A(x)‖22. Thus, x ± (/δ)v ∈ Sx,
where Sx = {x+ z ∈ Rd : 〈z,A(x)〉 ≥ ‖A(x)‖22}, and therefore, by our assump-
tion stated before Theorem 1, we have f(x) 6= f(x + u), where u = ±(/δ)v.
Putting all of this together, Pr (f(X + u) 6= f(X)) ≥ Pr (G ∩A) ≥ Pr (A) −
Pr (A ∩Gc) ≥ Pr (A)− Pr (Gc), and therefore,
Pr (f(X + u) 6= f(X)) ≥ Pr (f(X +A(X)) 6= f(X))− 1−λ1−δ2 .
Fig. 3: On CIFAR-10, ResNet18, Singular values of attack directions over a sample
of (top) 500 and (bottom) 10,000 test points.
Theorem 1 shows that any norm-bounded, input-dependent, adversarial attack
A can be converted into a universal attack u of comparable norm, without losing
much in the fooling, if the top eigenvalue λ of M is close to 1. This universal
attack direction lies in the one-dimensional span of the top eigenvector v of M .
The proof of Theorem 1 can be easily generalized to the top SVD subspace of
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M and where the top few eigenvalues of M dominate its spectrum (note that
tr (M) = 1).
Singular value drop. We empirically verify our hypothesis about top eigenvalue
(or the top few eigenvalues) dominating the spectrum of M in Theorem 1. Let
X1, X2, . . . , Xm be m i.i.d. samples of X drawn from the distribution D and
consider the unnormalized, empirical analog of M as follows,
m∑
i=1
A(Xi)
‖A(Xi)‖2
A(Xi)T
‖A(Xi)‖2
.
Figure (3) shows how the singular values drop for the three input dependent
attacks, Gradient, FGSM, and DeepFool on CIFAR-10 trained on ResNet18 on
batch sizes 500 and 10,000. These plots indicate that the drop in singular values
is a shared phenomenon across different input dependent attacks, and the trend
is similar even when we look at a small number of input samples.
Our second contribution is finding a good approximation to the universal
adversarial perturbation given by the top eigenvector v of M , using only a small
sample X1, X2, . . . , Xm from D. Theorem 2 shows that we can efficiently pick
such a small sample whose size is independent of D, depends linearly on the
intrinsic dimension of M , and logarithmically on the feature dimension d.
Theorem 2. Given any joint data distribution D on features in Rd and true
labels in [k], let (X,Y ) denote a random sample from D. For any x ∈ Rd, let
A(x) denote the adversarial perturbation of x according a fixed input-dependent
adversarial attack A. Let
M = E
[ A(X)
‖A(X)‖2
A(X)T
‖A(X)‖2
]
∈ Rd×d.
Let 0 ≤ λ = ‖M‖2 ≤ 1 denote the top eigenvalue of M and let v denote its corre-
sponding eigenvector (normalized to have unit `2 norm). Let r = tr (M) / ‖M‖2
be the intrinsic dimension of M . Let X1, X2, . . . , Xm be m i.i.d. samples of X
drawn from the distribution D, and let λ˜ =
∥∥∥M˜∥∥∥
2
be the top eigenvalue of the
matrix M˜ ,
M˜ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
A(Xi)
‖A(Xi)‖2
A(Xi)T
‖A(Xi)‖2
,
and v˜ be the top eigenvector of M˜ .
Also suppose that there is a gap of at least γλ between the top eigenvalue λ
and the second eigenvalue of M . Then for any 0 ≤  < γ and m = O(−2r log d),
we get ‖v − v˜‖2 ≤ /γ, with a constant probability. This probability can be boosted
to 1− δ by having an additional log(1/δ) in the O(·).
Proof. Take m = O(−2r log d). By the covariance estimation bound (see Ver-
shynin [15, Theorem 5.6.1]) and Markov’s inequality, we get that
∥∥∥M − M˜∥∥∥
2
≤ λ,
with a constant probability. Applying Weyl’s theorem on eigenvalue perturbation
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[15, Theorem 4.5.3], we get
∣∣∣λ− λ˜∣∣∣ ≤ λ. Moreover, if there is gap of at least γλ
between the first and the second eigenvalue of M with γ > , we can use the
Davis-Kahan theorem [15, Theorem 4.5.5] to bound the difference between the
eigenvectors as ‖v − v˜‖2 ≤ /γ, with a constant probability. Please see Appendix
D, and the book by [15] cited therein, for more details about the covariance
estimation bound, Weyl’s theorem, and Davis-Kahan theorem.
4 Data sets and model architectures used
Data sets. CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60, 000 images of 32× 32 size, divided
into 10 classes. 40, 000 used for training, 10, 000 for validation and 10, 000 for
testing. ImageNet dataset refers to ILSRVC 2012 dataset [12] which consists of
images of 224× 224 size, divided into 1000 classes. All experiments performed on
neural network-based models were done using the validation set of ImageNet and
test set of CIFAR-10 datasets.
Model Architectures. For the ImageNet based experiments we use pre-trained
networks of VGG16, VGG19 and ResNet50 architectures4. For the CIFAR-10
experiments we use the ResNet18 architecture as in He et al. [4].
5 Conclusion
We show how to use a small sample of input-dependent adversarial attack
directions on test inputs to find a single universal adversarial perturbation
that fools state of the art neural network models. Our main observation is a
spectral property common to different attack directions such as Gradients, FGSM,
DeepFool. We give a theoretical justification for how this spectral property helps
in universalizing the adversarial attack directions by using the top singular vector.
We justify theoretically and empirically that such a perturbation can be computed
using only a small sample of test inputs.
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A Connection between fooling rate and error rate
Let D be a distribution on pairs of images and labels, with images coming from a
set X ⊆ Rd. In the case of CIFAR-10 images, we can think of X to be the set of
32× 32 CIFAR-10 images with pixel values from [0, 1]. So each image is a vector
in a space of dimension 1024. Let (X,Y ) be a sample from D and let f : X → [k],
be a k-class classifier. The natural accuracy δ of the classifier f is defined to be
Pr(X,Y )∈D[f(X) = Y ].
The error rate of a classifier is Pr(X,Y )∈D[f(X) 6= Y ]. An adversary A is a
function X → Rd. When A is a distribution over functions we get a randomized
adversary. The norm of the perturbation applied to X is the norm of A(X) (we
only consider `2 norm in this paper).
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In Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8,9] and Khrulkov and Oseledets [5], the authors
consider the fooling rate of an adversary. A classifier f is said to be fooled on
input x by the perturbation A(x) if f(x+A(x)) 6= f(x). The fooling rate of the
adversary A is defined to be
Pr(X,Y )[f(X +A(X)) 6= f(X)].
The error rate of A on the classifier f is defined to be Pr(X,Y )∈D[f(X +A(X)) 6=
Y ]. It is easy to see that
Pr(X,Y )[f(X +A(X)) 6= f(X)] ≥ Pr(X,Y )[f(X +A(X)) 6= Y ]− (1− δ).
So, if the natural accuracy of the classifier f is high, the fooling rate is close
to the error rate. The error rate of the adversary with zero perturbation is the
error rate of the trained network, whereas the fooling rate of the adversary
with zero perturbation is necessarily zero. However, small fooling rate does not
necessarily imply small error rate, especially when the natural accuracy is not
close to 100%. Note that existing models such as VGG16, VGG19, ResNet50
do not achieve natural accuracy greater than 0.8 on the ImageNet dataset. In
Figure 4, we present the plots of SVD-Universal and M-DFFF on VGG16 and
ResNet50 networks using fooling rate and error rate for comparison.
VGG16 ResNet50
Fig. 4: On ImageNet validation, (top left): VGG16: error rate (bottom left)
VGG16: fooling rate (top right) ResNet50: error rate, (bottom right) ResNet50:
fooling rate, vs. norm of perturbation along top singular vector of attack directions
on 64 samples.
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B SVD-Universal on ImageNet
In Figure 5, each plot has the fooling rate on VGG16, VGG19 and ResNet50
attacked by the same universal method. This shows the effectiveness of the same
attack method on different networks. In Figure 6, to compare SVD-Universal
and M-DFFF we plot the fooling rate of both together for each network.
Fig. 5: On ImageNet validation, VGG16 vs VGG19 vs ResNet50: fooling rate
vs. norm of perturbation. Attacks constructed using 64 samples. (top left) SVD-
Gradient (top right) SVD-FGSM (bottom left) SVD-DeepFool and (bottom right)
M-DFFF universal.
VGG16 VGG19 ResNet50
Fig. 6: On ImageNet validation, (left): VGG16: fooling rate (center) VGG19:
fooling rate, (right) ResNet50: fooling rate, vs. norm of perturbation along top
singular vector of attack directions on 64 samples.
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B.1 SVD-Universal on ImageNet : Sample Complexity
Figure 7 shows the fooling rates obtained with SVD-Universal with batch size of
64, 128, 1024 on VGG16, VGG19 and ResNet50, respectively. We observed that
SVD-Universal attacks obtained using batch size of 64 perform as well as attack
vectors obtained using larger batch sizes of 128 and 1024.
Network Gradient FGSM DeepFool
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Fig. 7: On ImageNet validation, Fooling rate as per [8], on VGG16, VGG19 and
ResNet50 : fooling rate vs. norm of perturbation along top singular vector of
attack directions on 64/128/1024 sample
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B.2 SVD-Universal on CIFAR-10
In this section we plot the error rates of SVD-Universal on CIFAR-10 in Figure
8 trained on ResNet18 with batch size of 100/500/10000. In Figure 9 we plot
SVD-Universal and M-DFFF obtained with 100 samples for comparison. Similar
to the observation in Appendix B.1 we see that the universal attack with 100
samples performs comparable to the universal attack with larger batch size of
500 and 10000.
Fig. 8: On CIFAR-10, ResNet18: error rate vs. norm of perturbation along top
singular vector of attack directions on 100/500/10000 sample, (top left) Gradient
(top right) FGSM (bottom) DeepFool
Fig. 9: On CIFAR-10, ResNet18: error rate vs. norm of perturbation along top
singular vector of attack directions on 100 samples.
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C Visualizing SVD-Universal perturbations
We visualize the top singular vectors for the Gradient, FGSM, DeepFool directions
from ImageNet and CIFAR-10 in Figure 10 and Figure 11, respectively.
Fig. 10: For ImageNet, Top SVD vector from (left) Gradient, (center) FGSM,
(right) DeepFool on ResNet50.
Fig. 11: For CIFAR-10 (top) Top 5 SVD vectors from Gradient, (middle) Top
5 SVD vectors from FGSM, (bottom) Top 5 SVD vectors from DeepFool on
ResNet18.
D Proof details
Theorem 5.6.1 (General covariance estimation) from [15] bounds the spectral
norm of covariance matrix estimated from a small number of samples as follows.
Theorem 3. Let X be a random vector in Rd, d ≥ 2. Assume that for some
K ≥ 1, ‖X‖2 ≤ K
(
E
[
‖X‖22
])1/2
, almost surely. Let Σ = E
[
XXT
]
be the
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covariance matrix of X and Σm =
1
m
∑m
i=1XiX
T
i be the estimated covariance
from m i.i.d. samples X1, X2, . . . , Xm. Then for every positive integer m, we
have
E [‖Σm −Σ‖2] ≤ C
(√
K2d log d
m
+
K2d log d
m
)
‖Σ‖2 ,
for some positive constant C and ‖Σ‖2 being the spectral norm (or the top
eigenvalue) of Σ.
Note that using m = O(−2d log d) we get E [‖Σm −Σ‖2] ≤  ‖Σ‖2.
A tighter version of Theorem 5.6.1 appears as Remark 5.6.3, when the intrinsic
dimension r = tr (Σ) / ‖Σ‖2  d.
Theorem 4. Let X be a random vector in Rd, and d ≥ 2. Assume that for some
K ≥ 1, ‖X‖2 ≤ K
(
E
[
‖X‖22
])1/2
, almost surely. Let Σ = E
[
XXT
]
be the
covariance matrix of X and Σm =
1
m
∑m
i=1XiX
T
i be the estimated covariance
from m i.i.d. samples X1, X2, . . . , Xm. Then for every positive integer m, we
have
E [‖Σm −Σ‖2] ≤ C
(√
K2r log d
m
+
K2r log d
m
)
‖Σ‖2 ,
for some positive constant C and ‖Σ‖2 being the operator norm (or the top
eigenvalue) of Σ.
Note that using m = O(−2r log d) we get E [‖Σm −Σ‖2] ≤  ‖Σ‖2.
Theorem 4.5.3 (Weyl’s Inequality) from [15] upper bounds the difference
between i-th eigenvalues of two symmetric matrices A and B using the spectral
norm of A−B.
Theorem 5. For any two symmetric matrices A and B in Rd×d, |λi(A)− λi(B)| ≤
‖A−B‖2, where λi(A) and λi(B) are the i-th eigenvalues of A and B, respec-
tively.
In other words, the spectral norm of matrix perturbation bounds the stability of
its spectrum.
Here is a special case of Theorem 4.5.5 (Davis-Kahan Theorem) and its
immediate corollary mentioned in [15].
Theorem 6. Let A and B be symmetric matrices in Rd×d. Fix i ∈ [d] and assume
that the largest eigenvalue of A is well-separated from the rest of the spectrum,
that is, λ1(A)− λ2(A) ≥ δ > 0. Then the angle θ between the top eigenvectors
v1(A) and v1(B) of A and B, respectively, satisfies sin θ ≤ 2 ‖A−B‖2 /δ.
As an easy corollary, it implies that the top eigenvectors v1(A) and v1(B) are
close to each other up to a sign, namely, there exists s ∈ {−1, 1} such that
‖v1(A)− s v1(B)‖2 ≤
23/2 ‖A−B‖2
δ
.
